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Stable development and financing of the social protection
system, one of the priorities of fiscal policy in Chile over
recent years, has helped to reduce poverty and indigence,
particularly since the 1990s. The fiscal accounts have been
managed prudently, and budgetary balance and efficient
administration have been given priority over short-term
objectives. Even so, poverty is still a fact of life and the
poor are still vulnerable to drastic falls in income. This means
that an effort is still required to modernize fiscal policy and
develop new institutional arrangements for the social
protection system. This paper analyses the challenges
involved and the relationship among the different roles
played by fiscal policy in Chile over recent years.
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The main functions performed by fiscal policy in Chile
over recent years include the following: i) it has
contributed to macroeconomic stability and thereby
fostered economic growth; ii) it has generated stable,
balanced financing for the social protection system,
whose development has been made possible in part by
these favourable conditions; and iii) it has influenced
the institutional framework for social policy and the
basic system of social protection. This paper explores
and examines these functions, looks at the relationships
among them and considers how closely they are linked
together in the fiscal and social experience of Chile in
recent years.
The globalization of financial markets has made
fiscal stability ever more important. Increasing
economic globalization and market integration have
generated enormous growth and development
opportunities for the economies of Latin America. At
the same time, however, and as the incomes,
consumption opportunities and well-being of people
in emerging economies have increased, they have
become more vulnerable to fluctuations in the world
economy. The extra risk associated with countries’
increased exposure to external factors has been
accompanied by the development of insurance markets
and institutional and non-institutional protection
mechanisms.
In this constantly evolving economic context,
social protection policies are becoming more and more
important, not just as a means to equity but also as part
of an economic development strategy to cover the basic
risks facing lower-income sectors and thereby enable
them to take more proactive decisions in their quest to
overcome poverty. The social protection system seeks
to reduce the vulnerability or risks faced by the poorest
when shocks occur, in Chile or elsewhere.
In recent years, one of the priorities of fiscal policy
has been to develop the social protection system and
provide it with stable financing. Although reducing
poverty and indigence and combating inequities have
been the main thrusts of social policy, poverty is still a
fact of life and the poor remain vulnerable to drastic
falls in income.
The recent international economic crises severely
affected the economies of Latin America and highlighted
the situation of fiscal imbalance in which many of them
were placed, requiring painful economic adjustments that
intensified rather than mitigated the impact of the crises.
In the case of the Chilean economy, success in reconciling
strong growth in social spending with a sound, balanced
fiscal policy has made it possible to implement a large
range of temporary measures in crisis periods that have
cushioned the basic consumption patterns of the lower-
income population.
Chile is thus seen as an example of prudent, orderly
fiscal management in which efficient administration and
budgetary balance have been given priority over short-
term objectives and sustained fiscal support for social
development has been successfully reconciled with a
considerable reduction in public debt.
In this context, it is more and more important to
pursue fiscal responsibility so that the public finances
can be managed sustainably. To reduce macroeconomic
volatility, however, it is also necessary to allow fiscal
policy to play a countercyclical role. In Chile, the fiscal
rule that consists in maintaining a structural surplus of
1% of gross domestic product (GDP) is applied for
precisely this purpose.
The argument is that applying the 1% of GDP rule
allows public spending decisions to be based on the
more permanent availability of financing, so that
temporary revenue surges generated by the economic
cycle are not relied upon as a basis for spending, and
so that drops in revenue known to be temporary do not
result in unnecessary spending cuts. The benefits sought
are medium-term macroeconomic balance and
minimization of cycle-related costs (Ministry of
Finance, 2002b). The idea is that structural balance
should improve both transparency and flexibility in the
management of the public finances at any given point
in the cycle and should help make fiscal policy a key
instrument in promoting macroeconomic stability and
growth in the medium and long term.
The subject is a particularly important one where
social protection is concerned, since if future fiscal
I
Introduction
The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations
to which they belong.
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1. Fiscal responsibility and social protection
Over the economic cycles of the last two decades, fiscal
responsibility has become increasingly important to
economic management, and this is particularly true
where social policies in Latin America are concerned.
The large adjustments of the 1980s and the current
situation in some countries have shown very starkly
that irresponsible management of the public finances
can have very adverse economic and social
consequences.
Fiscal stability has increasingly been a key factor
in the sustained development of social policy
institutions, and it is particularly crucial at a time when
the globalization of financial markets has become a
reality. The procyclical nature of short-term
international capital and the vital role played by changes
in the terms of trade have led countries to design
mechanisms for self-insurance (such as stabilization
funds) and risk diversification (such as investments
abroad) to mitigate the effects of economic crises on
the public finances (De Ferranti, Perry and others,
2000). This makes it less likely that the budgets of the
different social programmes will have to be cut.
In addition to this, the way the public finances and
their link with social protection are regarded in
economic terms has been tending to shift in recent years.
There has been a gradual movement away from short-
term analysis centring on aggregate demand and the
liquidity available for financing and towards a medium-
term outlook centring on the scope for meeting the
needs of the population at times of crisis, on financial
sustainability, on fiscal risks, on intertemporal
budgetary constraints and on public-sector management
efficiency.
In this context, Chile stands out as an example of
prudent, orderly fiscal management suitably combined
with steady development of social policies.1 Efficient
administration and budgetary balance have been given
priority over short-term objectives, and this has meant
a greater capacity to respond to the social demands that
arise at times of crisis. During the 1990s, in fact, fiscal
support for social development was sustained even
during the economic slowdown of 1998-2002, while
between 1989 and 2002 gross central government debt
was reduced from 43.8% to 15.9% of GDP.2
This reduction in the public debt burden has
important consequences for the country’s ability to
maintain steady, stable growth in fiscal social spending
commitments are not properly anticipated there is the
risk that resources intended for social purposes may at
some point have to be diverted to cover liabilities as
they arise over time. This is why it is important to
consider the management of contingent liabilities as
one of the medium-term aspects of social protection
policies.
The task of fiscal policy is not over when it has
contributed to macroeconomic stability and stable
financing of the social protection system. On the
contrary, it has an active role to play in the development
and implementation of the system of public and semi-
public institutions in which social policies and
programmes operate. In other words, fiscal policy is
not neutral vis-à-vis the social protection structures that
arise as a result of its action.
This document contains four sections besides this
introduction. Section II provides a summary of
macroeconomic fiscal policy and the policy of structural
balance. Section III describes the social protection system
and its effects in reducing poverty and redistributing
income. Section IV shows the relationships between
fiscal policy and the institutional framework for social
programmes, and details the most important contingent




1 See Marcel and Tokman (2002) for an analysis of the main fiscal
reforms implemented in Chile over recent years.
2 In relative terms, this debt now compares favourably with the
figures for other countries. In the case of the most advanced
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries, for example, gross central government debt averaged 73%
of GDP in 2001, ranging from a low of 18% for the Republic of Korea
to a high of 132% for Japan. To compare with other countries, gross
general government debt ranges from 24% of GDP in the Czech
Republic to 70% in Brazil (Ministry of Finance, 2002a).
122 C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 1  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 3
FISCAL POLICY  AND SOCIAL  PROTECTION IN  CHILE •  ALBERTO ARENAS DE MESA AND JULIO GUZMAN COX
even at times of crisis. Firstly, the reduction in debt has
meant that substantially fewer resources are required
to service it, and this has direct consequences in that it
provides greater scope for fiscal policy to redirect
resources to social areas. Secondly, maintaining a low
level of public borrowing acts as a national protection
strategy, as fiscal adjustments are less likely to be
needed when interest rates rise sharply and when
international capital proves volatile, as it does in times
of crisis. Furthermore, lower public debt means that
the public sector can be more selective in its use of
external credit. This was the case with the sovereign
bond operations of the 2000-2002 period, which were
a step forward in consolidating the country’s financial
position.
The fiscal policy debate in Latin America has
centred on long-term financial sustainability, often
ignoring the effects of procyclical bias in fiscal policy
and the business cycle. Perry (2002) maintains that this
is a serious mistake, because in Latin America
procyclical policies have a huge cost in terms of growth
and welfare, especially for the poorest. Procyclical fiscal
policies and rules, he adds, tend to generate deficits so
that ultimately they are neither sustainable nor credible.
The instability of fiscal policies is probably one of
the underlying causes of macroeconomic volatility in
Latin America (De Ferranti, Perry and others, 2000).
For the public finances to be sustainable over time,
therefore, it is crucial that there be fiscal responsibility.
Yet fiscal policy also has to be allowed to play a
countercyclical role if macroeconomic volatility is to
be reduced, so that social policies do not have to be
sacrificed at times of crisis. This is one of the objectives
of the fiscal policy rule applied in Chile, which is
analysed below.
2. Structural balance and the fiscal policy rule:
rigidity or flexibility?
Macroeconomic fiscal policy has two overarching
objectives: to play a short-term stabilizing role and to
pursue long-term sustainability. In some economies,
pressures from society or interest groups often result
in the second objective being subordinated to the first,
which can trigger unsustainable fiscal deficits. Well-
designed fiscal policy rules can reconcile these two
overarching objectives.
Thus, in 2000 Chile brought in an explicit rule for
the formulation, management and evaluation of fiscal
policy that consists in maintaining a structural central
government surplus of 1% of GDP. Its objectives, the
structure of the fiscal policy indicator and its advantages
and limitations are described below.
a) Objectives of the structural balance indicator and
the fiscal policy rule
The specific objectives pursued by the fiscal policy
rules applied in various OECD countries include the
following: i) ensuring macroeconomic stability; ii)
enhancing the credibility of fiscal policy and helping
to stabilize the public debt; iii) ensuring the long-term
sustainability of fiscal policy; iv) minimizing the
negative externalities of international treaties, such as
the Maastricht Treaty; and v) reducing the procyclical
bias of fiscal policy.
The objective of the fiscal policy rule in Chile, it
has been argued, is to ensure that public spending
decisions take account of the availability of more
permanent financing, so that temporary revenue surges
arising from the business cycle are not relied upon as a
basis for spending, and so that revenue losses known
to be temporary do not result in unnecessary expenditure
cuts. The aim of this is to ensure medium-term
macroeconomic balance and to minimize cycle-related
costs (Ministry of Finance, 2002b). The idea is that
structural balance should increase both transparency and
flexibility in the management of the public finances at
any given point in the cycle and should help make fiscal
policy a key factor in macroeconomic stability and
growth in the medium and long term (Marcel, Tokman
and others, 2001).
b) Estimating the structural balance
Of the various fiscal policy indicators available in
Chile, the one chosen was the structural balance
indicator, partly because the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and OECD recognize, validate and apply its
methodology. Although it does not in itself entail a fiscal
policy rule, this indicator provides a basis for
establishing the 1% of GDP structural surplus rule.
To calculate the public-sector structural balance in
Chile, the IMF criteria for estimating structural balances
in developed countries were adopted. The standard
methodology followed by that organization was
adjusted in two ways to reflect the special characteristics
of the Chilean public sector. Firstly, expenditure was
not adjusted for the business cycle because there are
no spending programmes that respond automatically
to that cycle. Secondly, a specific adjustment was added
for copper revenue, as this is a major source of fiscal
revenue deriving from the exploitation of a raw material
whose price exhibits reversion to the mean.
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The public-sector structural balance thus reflects
what the amount of fiscal revenue and expenditure
would be if output were at its potential level and the
copper price were at its medium-term average. It
therefore excludes the cyclical and aleatory effects of
two factors that are of vital importance in Chile:
economic activity and the copper price.
The structural balance is estimated in three stages.
First, the adjusted balance is estimated. Accounting
adjustments are made to the actual balance to determine
the revenue and expenditure items to be included in
the adjusted balance so that it reflects net asset variation
in the public sector. Second, the cyclical components
of the budget are estimated, namely the effects of
cyclical changes in economic activity and the copper
price on fiscal aggregates. Two bodies were set up to
estimate the copper price and the level of activity in
the long term, each of them staffed by independent
experts: the Comité Consultivo del Precio de Referencia
del Cobre (Copper Reference Price Consultative
Committee) and the Comité Consultivo del PIB
Potencial (Potential GDP Consultative Committee). The
third stage consists in estimating the structural balance
from the adjusted balance and from the cyclical
components calculation.3
c) Advantages and limitations of the fiscal policy rule
Since 2001, the public finances of the central
government have been managed in accordance with the
1% of GDP structural surplus rule. Although this rule
has only been operating for a short time, it is possible
to identify a number of benefits deriving from its
application in the last three financial years.
Firstly, the policy rule has helped guide the
expectations of economic agents concerning the
direction of fiscal policy, allowing the benefits of future
prudence to be reaped immediately. Its application has
provided a signal of fiscal austerity and responsibility
at a particularly difficult time for the international
economy. Thus, one of the clear consequences of this
signal at the present time is that Chile’s country risk, as
measured by the spread of sovereign debt, has remained
extraordinarily low. This has protected the Chilean
economy and set it apart from the other countries of
Latin America (figure 1).
Similarly, the rapid structural improvement in the
public finances in 2000 created the confidence and scope
for the public sector to play a countercyclical role in 2001
and 2002. Internationally, this countercyclical character
of the public finances is one of the most striking features
of Chilean macroeconomic policy.
The policy rule has therefore made it possible to
reconcile two complementary objectives that are highly
desirable for an economy which depends as heavily on
external conditions as the Chilean economy does:
strengthening fiscal discipline and playing a
countercyclical role. Fiscal discipline has been
strengthened in the medium term by concentrating on
intertemporal financial sustainability and not on the
short-term liquidity available for financing. The effect
of this has been to reassure economic agents and
investors that accounting deficits are essentially
transitory and that financing needs are being kept down
to a level compatible with the capacity to generate fiscal
revenue over the medium term. The countercyclical
role, from a modern point of view, has taken account
of the costs entailed by a procyclical fiscal policy in
terms of growth and welfare (particularly that of the
poorest), one of the characteristic weaknesses of
developing economies. In fact, moderating the growth
of fiscal expenditure over time makes it less likely that
fiscal adjustments will be needed and allows social
policy institutions to develop more steadily.
In consequence, the structural surplus rule has not
brought any additional rigidity to fiscal policy. Rather,
3 See Marcel, Tokman and others (2001) for a detailed explanation
of the methodological aspects and procedure involved in estimating
the structural balance.
FIGURE 1
Latin America (four countries): Country risk as
measured by the spread of sovereign debt over
United States treasuries
(Basis points)
Source: JP Morgan Chase.
a/ Values in excess of 2000.
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it has set definite pre-announced limits to accounting
deficits, and these have provided the flexibility needed
to support economic growth, investment and the
development of social policies at times of particular
difficulty.
Where social policies are concerned, unqualified
commitment to the 1% of GDP structural deficit target
has helped reconcile fiscal austerity with the sustained
development of social protection policy institutions.
The stability that the application of this rule has brought
to the development of public policies is at least as
important as the countercyclical capacity of the public
finances and the credibility of the medium-term signal
that this generates. Application of the structural surplus
rule, combined with a major effort to reallocate
resources, has made it possible to carry on increasing
public-sector social and investment spending and to
implement new programmes to deal with the
consequences of the economic slowdown.
This is reflected, among other factors, in the recent
growth of social spending and public-sector investment,
which increased respectively by an estimated 5.8% and
7.9% in real terms annually between 2001 and 2003.
As table 1 shows, the above-average increases in this
priority spending over the last two years were achieved
through an effort to contain inertial growth in other
expenditure. The table also shows that while social and
investment spending saw this strong growth in 2001-
2003, expenditure on defence and operating costs (staff
and the procurement of goods and services) rose more
slowly than the average for the 1990s.
As for the limitations of the policy rule, these
include the lack of a legal framework to underpin its
application and ensure that its continuity does not
depend only on the political will of the present
Government. Although this has not undermined its
credibility in practice, it is worth considering what
mechanisms can be created to institutionalize it. The
international evidence regarding legal backing of this
type is very varied, however. Even if a legal instrument
has been put in place to establish the fiscal rule, it is
essential for effectiveness that it should be plausible,
which means that its design needs to allow for
continuing application by successive governments. In
the long run, this will depend not necessarily on the
force of the legal instrument establishing the rule, but
on whether it has been complied with in the past and
what costs would be entailed by breaking it in future.
The more institutionalized it is, the higher these costs
will be.
3. The role of countercyclical fiscal policy in social
protection
The policy rule has allowed social fiscal spending to
play a countercyclical role in a context of high external
volatility. It is necessary to ask, however, what
consequences the existence or otherwise of
countercyclical fiscal policies has for social protection.
The question is relevant, particularly for the
countries of Latin America, because there is a strong
perception of economic insecurity even in the countries
with the best development prospects (De Ferranti, Perry
and others, 2000). Along with this greater concern about
economic insecurity, there are signs of unmet demand
for social protection. It has been argued that this is partly
because market development and structural reforms
have not been matched by the parallel development of
an adequate system of social protection.
This is particularly worrying if we consider that
the poor are those most affected at times of crisis
because they lack the means to protect themselves, such
as financial assets, and because they are directly affected
by falling incomes from work. In addition, increased
employment for poor families during upturns is
generated in the informal sector (Tokman, 2001).
In this context, fiscal policy has an important role
to play in targeting the most vulnerable and worst
affected groups and in seeking a greater countercyclical
role at times of crisis.
The reality in Latin America, however, is far
different. In most of the region’s economies, fiscal
policy has not succeeded in discharging its stabilizing
function. Governments have generally adopted an
expansionary stance during upturns, then applied
contractionary policies in downturns. As a result, social
TABLE 1
Chile: Central government spending
(Annual percentage change in real terms)
Expenditure type Actual Budgeted
spending spending
1990-2000 2001-2003
Total expenditure 6.6 4.6
Economic classification
Operating costs 6.7 4.1
Real investment and
capital transfers 9.6 7.9
Functional classification
Defence 3.6 1.9
Social spending 7.9 5.8
Source: Dirección de Presupuestos, Ministry of Finance.
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spending on the poor is cut in recessions. The
procyclical nature of this spending results in a lack of
social protection during times of hardship, which are
exactly when it is most needed.4
In past crises, Chile was no exception. In 1975 and
1982, for example, economic activity declined by more
than 13% in real terms in one year, while unemployment
rose to 30%. In 1999 the Chilean economy was more
robust, but the Asian crisis still resulted in a 1.1% fall
in activity and unemployment approached 10% that
year. In those periods, meanwhile, total public spending
behaved procyclically (with the exception of 1999). In
1975 it actually fell by 23%, while in the 1982-1983
period public-sector investment fell by an average of
13% a year.
As already mentioned, one of the benefits of
today’s fiscal policy management using the structural
balance rule is the scope it offers for reconciling
increased spending with macroeconomic balance in
difficult periods. Even in present circumstances, in fact,
the policy combination adopted meant that output grew
by 2.1% in real terms in 2002.
The first step towards fiscal stability is to put the
public finances on a sustainable path. Chile has led the
way here, as in recent decades reserves have been saved
and put aside against difficult periods.
The second step is give fiscal policy a
countercyclical role that reduces aggregate volatility.
The 1% of GDP structural surplus rule plays an important
role in social protection. In this respect, the rule falls
into the category of “self-insurance” mechanisms
(Fiess, 2002). Accumulating resources during upturns
means that more can be done in difficult times. At the
same time the rule has the characteristics of a “self-
protection” mechanism, since by following it Chile has
reduced the likelihood of contagion from crises
affecting nearby countries and has differentiated itself
from the rest of Latin America.
The current fiscal policy rule, based on maintaining
expenditure growth at a level similar to that of structural
revenue growth, dampens the cycle and mitigates its
effects. During upturns, fiscal revenue increases and is
saved, which relieves the pressure on aggregate
demand. This contrasts with cases where these resources
are spent by the treasury or simply returned to
individuals. During times of recession, spending
temporarily rises by more than output and tax revenues,
the difference being made up from alternative sources
of financing.
Notwithstanding the above, one possible way of
enhancing the countercyclical nature of fiscal policy
that has come up in a theoretical context is to improve
the design of targeted programmes in relation to the
economic cycle. From the point of view of social
protection, it may be advisable to increase the
countercyclical component of some targeted
expenditure items or transfers that especially reach the
poorest population. One way of preventing the dynamic
of total expenditure from shifting over the course of
the cycle might be to make other fiscal spending more
procyclical or flexible, which would mean lessening
the inertia of a large proportion of total expenditure. In
many cases this tends not to be feasible, for example
where staff or pension expenses are concerned, which
makes this goal even harder to achieve.5 If it were done,
however, it would be possible to achieve total spending
growth in line with structural revenues while enhancing
the countercyclical character of targeted social
spending. Although this situation really shows a lack
of flexibility in fiscal expenditure, it is important to
bear it in mind because it could limit the effectiveness
of fiscal policy as a social protection mechanism for
the poorest.
4 See De Ferranti, Perry and others (2000, chapter 7), Wodon, Hicks
and others (1999) and Snyder and Yackovlev (2000) for an analysis
of the evidence on this point.
5 In 2001, pension and staff expenditure accounted for some 48% of
total spending by central government in Chile.
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The earliest forms of social protection applied in Chile
derived from the social theories formed in the late
nineteenth century. The first social assistance and
protection networks were created between this period
and the early decades of the following century. The
initiatives adopted included bills to mandate the
construction of workers’ housing and the approval of
tax incentives for building, compulsory basic education
and the health code (Arellano, 1985). These were some
of the earliest pillars of a social network that by 2002
accounted for over 16% of GDP.
In the area of social protection, in particular the
traditional and contributory systems, the so-called social
laws enacted during the first term of Arturo Alessandri
(1924) were the earliest social security measures applied
in Chile and were based on the German experience or
model designed by Bismarck the previous century. The
system was one of social insurance differentiated by
occupation. A second stage, lasting from the 1960s until
1980, took the universalization approach to social
security formulated in the Beveridge Plan. The third
stage, which is the current one, began in 1980. Its main
thrust is towards privatization of the management of
protection mechanisms (Arenas de Mesa, 2000).
There now coexist, in an odd mixture, a social
insurance structure along the lines of the early German
model that is being wound down for the most part,
consisting in the pension systems tailored to different
occupations that are run by the Institute of Social
Security Standardization (INP) and are still fully
operational for the military; a set of universal social
insurance schemes, many of them with elements of
social assistance, answering to Beveridge’s conception
of social insurance; and, lastly, insurance schemes
administered by the private sector, either on a pooled
basis as in the case of the pension fund managers (AFPs)
in respect of pensions, or on an alternative or optional
basis as in the case of the private health insurance
institutions (Isapres) in the health field.
The fact that over three million people are living
in poverty in Chile (Casen 2000 survey) means there is
a great need to strengthen the social protection system
in future. The tailing off of progress with poverty
reduction between 1998 and 2000 because of the
adverse international economic situation shows how
important this task is. Between 1990 and 1998, the
proportion of people living in poverty fell from 38.6%
to 21.7% of the total population, whereas in 2000 the
incidence of poverty fell only to 20.6%. The indigence
rate fell from 12.9% to 5.6% between 1990 and 1998,
but in 2000 it rose slightly to 5.7%.
To deal with the new challenges, the social
protection system will have to modernize and change
its institutional structure. The efforts of protection
networks will need to be coordinated and administered
more efficiently, and institutions will need to be more
flexible and decentralized. Information-gathering
followed by the creation of a social protection
information system, along with a new institutional
structure for public-sector social protection policies,
will need to be the basic pillars upon which a new social
order can be built and consolidated in Chile (Arenas de
Mesa and Benavides, 2003).
1. Public spending and poverty
One of the main objectives of fiscal policy has been
the development and stable financing of social policies
and the social protection system. Meanwhile, reducing
poverty and indigence and combating inequity have
been the main objectives of social policy. Poverty is
still a fact of life, however, and the poor are still unable
to meet their basic needs, while remaining vulnerable
to drastic falls in income.
Between 1990 and 2001, the size of the State,
measured by public spending as a share of GDP, rose
from 20.2% to 23.5% (figure 2). In Chile, major social
reforms were introduced during the 1990s and many
new programmes were begun. Between 1990 and 2000,
social spending rose by an average of 7.9% a year in
real terms, while in the same period total central
government spending grew by an average of 6.6% a
year in real terms. When the sectoral composition of
social spending is analysed, what stands out is the
growth in education spending, which increased by an
average of 10.6% a year in real terms. It was followed
III
The social protection system
and fiscal policy
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by health spending, which grew by an average of 9.4%
a year.
With this rate of growth social spending has
substantially increased its share of the total, from 61.4%
in 1990 to 69.9% in 2001 (figure 3). If social spending
is broken down by sector, it transpires that the share
going to education rose from 20% to 26%, while that
going to health rose from 15% to 18% over the period.
At the same time, pension spending fell from 49% to
40% of social spending and housing expenditure from
7% to 6%. The growth in social spending took it from
12.4% of GDP in 1990 to 16.4% in 2001 (figure 2).
From the social point of view, positive results have
included a reduction in poverty from 38.6% of the
population in 1990 to 20.6% in 2000, and of indigence
from 12.9% in 1990 to 5.7% in 2000 (figure 4). As a
proportion of households, poverty fell from 33.3% to
16.6% and indigence from 10.6% to 4.6% in the same
Source: Dirección de Presupuestos (2000 and 2001b).
FIGURE 2
Chile: Social spending and total public spending as a percentage of GDP,
1990-2001
FIGURE 3
Chile: Social spending as a percentage of total public spending, 1990-2001a/
Source: Dirección de Presupuestos (2001b and 2002).
a/ Central government spending.
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period. The average gap between the incomes of the
population as a whole and those of the poor and indigent
also fell significantly, from 14.8 to 7.1 times in the case
of the poor and from 4.3 to 2.1 times in the case of
indigence.
2. Coverage of the social protection system by
function
The system of social protection can be classified by its
functions as they relate to old age, survivors, disability,
occupational accidents and diseases, the family
(children and sickness), health care, public health,
employment, unemployment, poverty and social
exclusion. Table 2 analyses the coverage of the
functions served by the system for selected population
groups. Employees are covered by all the programmes
of the social protection network, but this is not the case
with own-account workers, whose coverage will depend
on membership of and actual contributions to the
system, among other factors. Both contributory and
non-contributory systems have varying requirements,
particularly as regards means testing in the case of non-
contributory systems. The system of social protection
for informal sectors and for family, temporary and self-
employed workers is less comprehensive than that for
employed workers owing, among other factors, to the
characteristics of the population and the labour market
at the time the programmes concerned were created.
One of the challenges for the future is to consider how
the system can be modified or redesigned to deal with
the situation of these population groups.
3. The social protection system and its
distributive effect
In 2002, about 1,884,500 fewer people were living in
poverty than in 1990. Nonetheless, inequality has
remained virtually unchanged.
To take the distribution of autonomous income,
between 1990 and 2000 the share of total income received
by the first decile (lowest incomes) fell from 1.4% to
1.1%, while the tenth decile (highest incomes) increased
its share from 42.2% to 42.3% in the same period. The
distribution of monetary income, which includes
autonomous income and cash benefits, is still quite
regressive. In the 1990-2000 period, the income share
of the first decile fell from 1.6% to 1.5% of the total,
while that of the tenth decile fell from 41.8% to 41%.
In 1990, the Gini coefficient for this distribution was
0.58 and 0.57 for autonomous and monetary income,
respectively, and the figures for this indicator remained
unchanged in 2000. The 20/20 (quintiles) index, which
measures the ratio between the average autonomous
incomes of the fifth and first quintiles, rose from 14 to
15.3 between 1990 and 2000, while in the same period
this ratio rose from 12.9 to 13.2 for monetary income.6
Source: Mideplan (2001).
FIGURE 4
Chile: Change in the incidence of poverty and indigence
(Percentage of total population)
6 Mideplan, Casen 1990 and 2000 surveys.
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The stagnation of income distribution has given
rise to a controversy about the mechanisms available
to society for dealing with a problem of this scale that
potentially calls into question the working of the
economic and social model.
Between 1990 and 2000, social policy helped
improve income distribution. The cash benefits
provided by the State are highly focused on the low-
income quintiles. For this reason, income distribution
looks better when the analysis includes monetary
transfers by the public sector. When monetary income
is considered, i.e., autonomous income plus monetary
transfers by the State in the form of welfare pensions,
unemployment benefits, the different types of family
allowance, drinking water subsidies and others, income
distribution is better in every year from 1990 to 2000.
In fact, the greatest contribution by social spending to
improving income distribution was made in 2000. When
cash benefits are considered, the ratio of average
incomes between the richest 20% of the population and
the poorest 20% falls from 15.3 to 13.2.
In 2000, cash benefits represented just 14% of the
monetary income of the first autonomous income
quintile, 4.3% of the monetary income of the second
quintile and 1.7% of the monetary income of the third
quintile. According to the Casen 2000 survey, income
distribution improves significantly when the monetary
contribution of the main health and education
programmes is calculated, owing to the targeting of
these programmes. In 2000, for example, benefits in
kind represented almost 59% of monetary income for
the first autonomous income quintile, 23% for the
second quintile and 11% for the third.
When income distribution is corrected to include
cash benefits and a monetary value for benefits in kind,
the ratio between the average incomes of the fifth and
first autonomous income quintiles falls from 15.3 to
8.3 in 2000. These figures show what a substantial
progressive effect social policies have, not so much in
terms of monetary incomes as in improved distribution
of overall incomes when a monetary value is set on
benefits in kind (figure 5).
TABLE 2
Chile: Social protection coverage by population group
Function
Population group Old age Survivors Disability Occupational Family Sickness Public Unemployment Poverty
accidents and children health and social
diseases exclusion
People with employment contract X X X X X X X X X
Self-employed workers Xª Xª Xª Xb X X X X X
Self-employed non-agricultural workers
and family members assisting thema Xª Xª Xª Xb X X X X X
Self-employed agricultural workers and
family members assisting thema Xª Xª Xª Xb X X X X X
Unemployed in receipt of some
unemployment benefitb Xc Xc Xc X X X X X
Unemployed not in receipt of any
unemployment benefitb Xc Xc Xc X X X X X
Adults dependent upon employed
persons (economically inactive
spouses, relatives) Xª Xª Xª X X X X
Children of employed persons X X X X X
Other economically inactive X X X X X
Source: Arenas de Mesa and Benavides (2003).
a Entitled to contributory benefits such as old-age, survivor’s or disability pensions only if they have voluntarily paid the required contributions.
Otherwise, they are entitled only to apply for welfare pensions.
b Self-employed workers and family workers who voluntarily enrol in the system and pay contributions may be entitled to the benefits
provided for by occupational accidents and diseases legislation.
c Entitled to contributory benefits such as old-age pensions only if they have paid the necessary contributions during periods of employment.
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1. The role of fiscal policy in the development of
social policy institutions
a) The scope of fiscal policy
Alongside monetary and exchange-rate policy,
fiscal policy plays a crucial role in creating the
conditions for economic growth in the country, which
is fundamental if a new level of development is to be
achieved. The principal way in which fiscal policy can
foster economic growth is by playing a stabilizing role
in the short term and pursuing sustainability in the long
term.
At the same time, fiscal policy has a preponderant
function in the financing of social spending, which in
2002 represented more than 70% of total public-sector
expenditure. The State has a responsibility for the
country’s social and cultural development that
complements its role in economic development, and
this is discharged by working to generate greater
opportunities for people and by building a social
protection network, particularly for those who are more
deprived and do not have proper access to basic goods
and services. Measures to achieve this include sectoral
social policies for education, health care, housing and
pensions and transversal social policies such as the full
development of women and children at social risk and
the eradication of poverty. It is essential for fiscal policy
to provide stable, ongoing and effective financing for
these policies, always seeking to improve the efficiency
of public spending and the impact of the different
programmes on the beneficiary population.
A good example of this are the bills to reform health
care and set up the basic system of social protection
known as Chile Solidario, which are going through
Congress. In the first case, fiscal policy has not only
sought to create budgetary frameworks for a system of
health-care guarantees, but is concerning itself with the
basic outlines of the desired health-care model. This
has translated into a multitude of decisions about
measures to strengthen primary care institutions,
improve hospital management, implement a
performance-related pay system for staff and develop
health targets.
The Chile Solidario system represents an effort to
create a new system of social protection that takes a
comprehensive approach to extreme poverty, rather than
simply supplying resources for implementation. The
idea is that, with its national network, the Chile
Solidario system should actively involve the State in
identifying the neediest families so that benefits,
FIGURE 5
Chile: Composition of household incomes in the first and fifth autonomous per capita




Fiscal policy, contingent liabilities
and social policy institutions
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payments and public-sector provision really do go to
those who need them most. This also involves an effort
to coordinate the social networks and services of the
State and public-sector providers for the poorest so that
they can meet the specific needs of every family by
working directly and personally with each.
If it is considered that over 70% of public spending
is social in nature, it can easily be imagined that
different strategic decisions on government policy
orientation, going beyond the mere allocation of
resources, are being taken day by day. There also have
to be decisions about the way the public sector is
organized and structured in its different functions. The
use made of fiscal resources cannot be optimized
without regard to the institutional arrangements that
exist, since these usually determine the efficiency of
public spending on social programmes.
b) Progress and challenges
The public-sector institutions dealing with social
programmes are the outcome of a range of factors,
including the founding principles of the modern State,
the structural reforms of past decades and the fiscal
policies applied in recent years.
The institutional basis of the State has made it
possible to build a broad, stable public-sector system
capable of attending to social priorities. Through State
action, basic tasks have been undertaken in areas such
as education, health care, housing, pensions and social
protection. At the same time, the State has been
increasingly active in regulating the economic and
financial life of the country.
As the State has developed, there has been a shift
in the type of activities performed by the public sector.
This has mainly meant a substantial reduction in the
productive functions of the State and a reallocation of
functions between it and the private sector, which has
been particularly dramatic in the sphere of social
services provision. At the same time, the fiscal
adjustment process of the 1980s taught hard lessons
about the importance of public spending control and
fiscal discipline.
In the 1990-2003 period, progress was made with
this fiscal discipline and with measures to strengthen the
regulation and oversight functions, the subcontracting
of services, the restoration of working conditions in the
public sector and the creation and enhancement of
different social programmes.
The challenge now is to allocate fiscal resources
in public-sector and social programmes in a way that is
macroeconomically efficient. There is now general
agreement that the responsibility of the public-sector
financial authority consists not just in spending within
a framework of budgetary constraint, but in spending
efficiently. For this it is important to recognize that
financial management standards are crucial for the
proper administration of public-sector institutions. The
way resources are delivered and the responsibilities and
commitments shared between the financial authority
and administrative bodies largely determine the overall
efficiency with which public funds are allocated and
used.
By contrast with other countries, the institutional
changes needed in the public sector do not centre on
efforts to reduce staffing or cut chronic fiscal deficits.
Rather, the need is to bring in management systems
and procedures that ensure public resources are used
as efficiently as possible and that enhance the overall
impact of social policies on the beneficiary population.
Again, the sum of individual benefits and
programmes does not necessarily constitute a social
protection system. This is a problem that also affects
most other countries in Latin America, partly because
of the lack of a shared institutional framework, an
information network linking together access services,
thorough coordination among organizations and shared
eligibility criteria.
These shortcomings result in the duplication of
functions and in administration costs that undermine
system inefficiency. Provision is often concentrated
on beneficiaries who are better connected to the social
network, with the result that potential beneficiaries
who are not so connected are left uncovered. Even
more importantly, synergies among the different
organizations are forfeited owing to the lack of
coordination.
To deal with these problems, there is a need to
develop clear guidelines that give a preponderant role
to fiscal policy. The dispersion of public-sector
institutions and programmes is a challenge that needs
to be dealt with, and the financial authority of the State
can and should be applied to this objective in a
comprehensive, transversal way through the functions
currently performed by the different ministries, services
and social programmes.
This is particularly important if we consider that
there are currently some 400 social programmes
involving 80 different institutions. At least 40 of these
can be classed as social protection programmes.
The activities undertaken by these public-sector
programmes and organizations have given citizens
throughout the country greater access to basic social
132 C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 1  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 3
FISCAL POLICY  AND SOCIAL  PROTECTION IN  CHILE •  ALBERTO ARENAS DE MESA AND JULIO GUZMAN COX
services. Progress needs to be increased, however, not
just as regards coverage, but also from a strategic point
of view with priority being given to improving the
quality of these different aspects of public-sector action.
To this end, a management control system has been
developed and improved in recent years, and this uses
instruments such as performance indicators,
institutional and programme evaluations, competitive
funds for the financing of public-sector investment and
programmes, management improvement programmes
and comprehensive management reviews.7
Notwithstanding this progress, there is a need to
improve on the current quality standards of the public
sector. Among other measures, this will mean focusing
on its products and services and reorganizing its internal
operations.
Included within this is a need to strengthen the pillars
on which a basic system of social protection rests:
coherence and informed access for beneficiaries; priority
for the family; effective targeting on the neediest groups;
the development of selection mechanisms and eligibility
conditions that are consistent across the different
programmes; and the existence of appropriate and
coherent State institutions (Arenas de Mesa and
Benavides, 2003).
In respect of all this, it is up to fiscal policy to
harmonize the maintenance of fiscal balances and make
public services more proactive and responsible, and not
the central authority. There is also a need to move
forward with modernization of the budgetary process
and to create and improve mechanisms that stimulate
the development of public-sector management.
2. Contingent liabilities and the sustainability of
social protection policies
The growing importance of the intertemporal dimension
in the public finances has resulted in greater attention
being given to the evaluation and management of the
fiscal risk associated with the effects of public-sector
assets and liabilities on future revenue and expenditure
flows.
Because so little attention was paid to the issue in
the past, there are still problems with fiscal valuation,
quantification and management of these medium-term
effects or commitments. There are countries where rigid
spending discipline has been exercised, but where the
same discipline has not been applied to explicit or
implicit financial commitments that sooner or later will
have to be met.
One issue of particular importance is that of
contingent liabilities in the public sector, which can go
unnoticed until they materialize, at which point there
is little or no prospect of their being neutralized by short-
term measures.
The subject is particularly important from a social
protection point of view, since if future fiscal
commitments are not properly foreseen, there is a risk
that resources intended for social ends may at some
point have to be sacrificed to cover liabilities that have
been accruing and maturing over time. This is why it is
important to treat the management of contingent
liabilities as one of the medium-term aspects of social
protection policies.
a) Medium-term fiscal risks and contingent liabilities
The different types of public-sector liabilities can
be classified by the fiscal risk associated with each, in
the light of two complementary aspects. The first aspect
is whether the liabilities are explicit or implicit, and
the second is whether they are direct or contingent
(Polackova, 1998).
By an explicit liability is meant one that is
contractually or legally recognized. We speak of implicit
liabilities, on the other hand, when what is at stake is
rather a moral imperative or a statement of objectives,
such as a commitment to assist the indigent or people
who lack pension provision. The distinction between
direct and contingent liabilities depends on whether a
triggering event is involved. Direct liabilities must be
met in all circumstances, i.e., no particular event is
required to make them effective. Contingent liabilities
arise only when a particular event occurs, e.g., the
bankruptcy or insolvency of a financial institution.
In most countries, explicit direct liabilities are
commonly recognized, quantified and classified as
liabilities. Examples of these are the external public-
sector debt and expenditure included in the budget act.
Implicit direct liabilities, meanwhile, almost always
arise as State obligations deriving mainly from medium-
term public policies. In Chile, welfare pensions (known
as PASIS) belong to this category, and in this case the
existence of a self-imposed legal obligation means that
the State has an implicit commitment, of a moral and
social nature, towards indigent people who lack pension
provision.
Implicit contingent liabilities are not officially
recognized and may derive from declared political
objectives or political pressure from interest groups7 For further details, see Dirección de Presupuestos (2002).
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existing at a particular time. Examples of such liabilities
include private-sector bank rescues by the State when
a severe financial crisis occurs, liabilities generated
when local governments fail to repay non-guaranteed
debts, or aid to victims of natural disasters.
Explicit contingent liabilities are those that have
most commonly been classified as true contingent
liabilities. They are spelt out in advance by law or
contract, but whether the associated expenditure is
triggered and how much it amounts to depend on a
particular event actually taking place. Examples of this
kind of liabilities include the State deposit guarantee,
the minimum revenue guarantee for transport
concessions and the State minimum pension guarantee
for the private-sector pension system.
The recent increase in liabilities of this type is
largely due to the changing role of the State, which has
tended to move from financing and providing services
directly to guaranteeing the achievement of particular
results by the private sector. Consequently, there is an
increasing need for efforts to identify and quantify them
on a systematic, ongoing basis.
b) Contingent liabilities that are important in Chile
For Chile, an initial analysis has identified four
major contingent liabilities (Dirección de Presupuestos,
2001a). They are as follows:
i) The minimum revenue guarantee for transport
concessions: contracts stipulate minimum revenues
from tolls, guaranteed by the Ministry of Public
Works, Transport and Telecommunications (MOP)
for each year the concession is operated. If actual
revenue is below the minimum, MOP has to make
up the difference;
ii) The State deposit guarantee: banking obligations
for term deposits and investments in the form of
savings accounts or personal or bearer instruments
held by natural persons specifically include a State
guarantee of 90% if the bank should fail, with a
limit of 108 UF per person. There is also a 100%
State guarantee for current account deposits, sight
deposits and other liquid financial instruments. The
bankruptcy of financial institutions is the uncertain
event that makes this liability a contingent one;
iii) Claims against the Treasury: the State and
dependent institutions can be sued by individuals
or organizations that believe they have been
prejudiced by its activities. The fact that the State
is only obliged to indemnify individuals if the
ruling goes against the Treasury makes this a
contingent liability;
iv) The State minimum pension guarantee for the
private-sector pension fund manager (AFP) system:
the AFP system establishes that if the pension
entitlement upon retirement of a worker who has
paid at least 240 months of contributions is below
a certain minimum, the State will make up the
difference when that worker’s individual account
runs out. The obligation thus accepted by the
Treasury is a subsidiary one, as its objective is to
deal with the contingency whereby the resources
accrued by the worker in his or her individual
capitalization account, plus the bono de
reconocimiento (an instrument representing the
monetary value of payments into the pre-AFP
system) where relevant, are insufficient to finance
a minimum pension whose value is set by the State
itself. Furthermore, this contingent liability is not
the only obligation that arises for the State in
relation to the pensions system. There is also the
operating deficit of the old public pension system,
payment of bonos de reconocimiento, welfare
pensions (PASIS) and the deficit accrued on the
military pensions paid by the armed forces and
carabineros pension funds.
In quantifying these liabilities, it is usually
necessary to distinguish between the maximum possible
value of each and the expected value. An initial analysis
conducted by the Ministry of Finance showed the total
values of transport concessions to which minimum
revenue guarantees applied and the maximum
disbursement for which the State could be liable under
the State deposit guarantee if every single banking
institution were to fail, put at 28% of GDP. The study
also includes the amounts paid out for claims against
the Treasury and spending projections for the State
minimum pension guarantee (Dirección de
Presupuestos, 2001a).
There is also an obligation to submit to the National
Congress, together with the 2004 budget bill, a
supplementary financial report providing information
on contingent liabilities, among other things. This
report, which has now been presented, is in a standard
format and contains information on variables that are
not directly allowed for in the budget bill, but that may
entail risks for the performance of the public finances
in future. Another step in this direction is the creation
of the Public Finances Division of the Budgetary Affairs
Bureau which is responsible, among other functions,
for supervising and administering the financial assets
of public-sector enterprises and the relationship with
multilateral banking organizations.
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1. The modernization of fiscal policy
The challenges involved in implementing, measuring
and evaluating fiscal policy are of particular importance
for developing countries such as Chile. Management
of the public finances on an intertemporal,
countercyclical basis as a key element in a social
protection strategy requires progress to be made towards
better measurement, supervision and management of
contingent liabilities and their medium-term effects.
This is particularly important considering that in
most countries contingent liabilities relate to off-budget
programmes. This status has sometimes allowed
liabilities of this type to be used as a way of carrying
on with programmes without affecting the short-term
fiscal balance. In the medium and long term, however,
these contingent liabilities considerably increase fiscal
risk and expose the Treasury to situations that could be
destabilizing for the public finances, thereby reducing
the ability of fiscal policy to play a preponderant role
in social protection for the most vulnerable.
For this reason, there is a need to improve fiscal
management methodologies and practices related to the
handling of contingent liabilities. Requirements include
increasing the transparency of information about off-
budget liabilities and moving from cash budgets to
accrual-basis budgets that include contingent liabilities.
In this context, fiscal policy plays a decisive role
in the institutional design of social protection systems,
not only to achieve stable, sustained financing of these
programmes over time, but through the application of
institutional designs that are compatible with financial
and fiscal capabilities and that efficiently meet the needs
of the most vulnerable.
2. Challenges facing the social protection system
In the 1990s, changes in social indicators in different
sectors revealed significant progress with the quality
and equity of social spending and improvements in its
targeting. Furthermore, policies designed to achieve
macroeconomic and social stability were implemented
in a coordinated fashion, and it has been claimed as a
result that 1990s fiscal policy was an important factor
in achieving economic and political stability.
The social protection system also faces new
challenges, such as the demographic transition and the
growing participation of women in the labour market.
Combined with the levelling off of the indigence rate
in 1996, 1998 and 2000, these changes suggest that a
new strategy needs to be designed and executed so that
instruments and policies intended to help those in
extreme poverty can achieve the objective of delivering
a basic social protection network.
Within this frame of reference, Chile needs to
modernize the social protection system and implement
a new institutional structure. One of the main tasks is
an institutional redesign to strengthen and rationalize
the State institutions responsible for the basic system
of social protection, including an exhaustive review of
all current benefits, transfers, funds and support
programmes that do not form part of the core tasks of
the sectoral ministries (education, health and housing)
or contributory social security programmes, and then
to develop out of them a system of social protection
under the charge of a single institution, which is the
“one-stop shop” concept. This one-stop shop principle
should inform the organization of the new social
protection system and be applied both at a macro
institutional level and at the micro level of the individual
beneficiary. At the macro level, management, resources
and social protection network policy design need to be
brought together in a single institution. At the micro
level, a unified service to beneficiaries should mean
better integration of different aspects of public-sector
activity, simplified access to provision as unnecessary
levels of interaction are done away with, and integration
of activities, improving the targeting and efficiency of
social protection.
Whether or not success is achieved in reducing
indigence will largely depend on the institutional
arrangements that determine how and where benefits
are delivered. Particular attention needs to be paid, too,
to the way in which these instruments actually reach
beneficiaries. For indigence to be reduced, it may not
be enough to offer instruments and benefits. A proactive
approach also needs to be applied, centring on demand
and beneficiaries, as this has the potential to increase
the efficiency of the mechanisms designed. Such efforts
to seek out demand, which must necessarily have a
V
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strong local component, also need to be properly
coordinated with the “one-stop shop” described above.
Another principle that needs to be considered in
any new institutional design is the targeting unit. The
unit of reference for the targeting of public action should
be the family, and not the individual. Thus, the targeting
of social protection could be improved by using a
concept of family income that takes account of an actual
family situation, understood as an overarching group
that maintains close links rather than as the sum of the
situations of individuals considered separately.
The same holds for targeting criteria, the third key
principle of the new institutional arrangements needed
for the basic social protection system. Although the
great majority of social protection programmes are
already closely targeted, there are still major challenges
in this area. The results in terms of social protection
achieved in the 1990s show the importance of proper
targeting and the redistributive effects that social
protection programmes can have. International evidence
shows that the poverty reduction process can advance
at different speeds in economies with similar growth
rates. This is largely due to differences in income
concentration and the rapidity with which this improves
(ECLAC, 2002). In future, one of the key factors in
achieving good results with poverty reduction will be
proper targeting of the benefits of the social protection
system. The more closely targeted public-sector action
is, the greater and more rapid the social results will be.
Specifically, the social protection system should give
priority to the indigent and poor populations,
particularly in the countryside.
Along with institutional redesign of the social
protection system, it will be essential to strengthen,
expand and in some cases implement information
systems for social protection policies. The selection
mechanism currently used, the CAS II information
system, will have to form part of this adaptation process
so that new information requirements are properly met
and social programmes are efficiently targeted. A new
information and selection system could be used to
improve social policy evaluation and follow-up and to
cope with economic, demographic and social transition,
which will require social protection systems to be
continually reviewed and adapted.
This type of design will be conducive to greater
public policy integration and to the coordination of
sectoral efforts, and will prevent duplication of effort
and waste of public resources. The only potential
constraint on the basic social protection network will
be budgetary restrictions, since it is these that limit the
value of benefits and the number of new beneficiaries,
for example, in the welfare pensions and family benefit
system. One way of modernizing the social protection
network would be to provide more benefits to those
who best qualify for them in the case of extreme poverty
and reaffirm their right to these benefits, which confirms
still more the need for institutional redesign to guarantee
these families’ rights. Applying an approach of this kind,
in conjunction with the other challenges facing the
social protection network, is the basis for a new social
policy strategy to reduce indigence and extreme poverty.
In summary, we can say that sustained economic
development is the basic precondition for solving the
problem of poverty and creating a stable, integrated
system of social protection that gives people equality
of opportunity. Social deprivation is an obstacle to any
ambitions for a democratic society.
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